Today, that empire is undergoing a visible and sometimes painful transformation. But the plan ran headlong into the energy price shock of 2022, which followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sent crude oil prices surging above $120 per barrel. Its Gulf of Mexico assets remain among the most productive deepwater fields in the United States. Following the catastrophic 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP spent more than a decade restructuring its balance sheet and portfolio. The Oil Production & Operations segment remains BP's largest profit engine in raw dollar terms. It encompasses upstream exploration, development, and production of crude oil and natural gas across four geographic regions: the North Sea and North Africa; the Gulf of Mexico and Canada; the Middle East; and Asia Pacific. BP's Total Production in 2024 was approximately 2.4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (MMBOED). The segment's profitability is heavily tied to the prevailing benchmark price of Brent crude oil, which averaged approximately $80 per barrel in 2024, down from the $100-plus peaks of 2022. The Customers & Products segment is BP's downstream operation and one of the most diverse revenue streams in its portfolio. The Whiting refinery alone processes approximately 430,000 barrels per day, serving the US Midwest market and generating refining margins that fluctuate with the crack spread between crude oil and refined product prices. Beyond the four segments, BP generates significant revenue and earnings through its integrated supply and trading operations. Seven years of expensive, largely fruitless drilling followed before the May 1908 discovery of oil at Masjid-i-Suleiman — the first major oil find in the Middle East. The Deepwater Horizon payments continue. The Whiting, Indiana refinery processes 430,000 barrels per day. TotalEnergies' 2024 production grew to approximately 2.5 MMBOED while its renewable energy installed capacity reached approximately 24 gigawatts — metrics that suggest a more balanced execution of the integrated energy model that BP has articulated but struggled to deliver. TotalEnergies also benefits from France's more accommodating regulatory environment for nuclear energy and has been more aggressive in acquiring LNG assets in Qatar and the US Gulf Coast. That 20% decline is not a sign of operational deterioration; it is the arithmetic of oil prices falling from above $100 per barrel back toward $70-80. No other industry produces revenue swings of $50-80 billion in a single year without any corresponding change in the volume of product sold. The entire variation comes from the price of the commodity, which BP cannot control. The Deepwater Horizon payments are still ongoing, still consuming cash flow. BP's earnings and cash generation are heavily used to the price of Brent crude oil, which averaged around $80 per barrel in 2024 — a level that generates adequate but not exceptional returns given BP's cost structure. The reputational legacy of Deepwater Horizon continues to impose costs. Debt management represents an ongoing structural constraint. Reducing this debt while funding the dividend, maintaining capital expenditure, and buying back shares requires sustained high commodity prices — a condition that management cannot guarantee. The financial flexibility that BP needs to make far-reaching acquisitions or weather a prolonged price downturn is meaningfully constrained by this balance sheet position. Its deepwater Gulf of Mexico operations — particularly the Thunder Horse, Atlantis, Mad Dog, and Constellation fields — represent some of the most productive and cost-competitive offshore production in the world. And in the Middle East, BP's decades-long relationships with national oil companies in Iraq, Abu Dhabi, and Oman give it preferential access to low-cost reserves. Operating across more than 60 countries with assets spanning multiple commodity types and regulatory environments means that BP is not dependent on any single market, price benchmark, or political relationship for its financial stability — a structural hedge that smaller energy companies cannot match. In 2024, BP sold its stake in several European offshore wind projects, crystallizing losses but freeing capital for higher-return assets. He had never drilled for oil. The concession covered 500,000 square miles — an area larger than France and Germany combined. For six years, D'Arcy's teams drilled through extreme heat, disease, and hostile terrain, finding nothing commercially significant. By 1908, D'Arcy had spent himself nearly dry. Then, on May 26, 1908, at a site called Masjid-i-Suleiman in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, a gusher erupted. It was the first major oil discovery in the Middle East. The trading element is particularly important: BP's gas and power trading operation functions almost like a commodity hedge fund embedded within the broader company, generating returns based on market structure, location arbitrage, and the improvement of physical assets. In the Gulf of Mexico alone, BP operates some of the most productive deepwater fields in the world, including the Thunder Horse, Atlantis, and Mad Dog platforms, which collectively produce more than 300,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day. It includes refining operations at facilities in the United States (Whiting, Indiana, one of the largest refineries in the US Midwest), Australia, and Europe; petrochemical production through the Castrol lubricants brand, which holds a commanding market position in engine oils worldwide; and the global retail fuel and convenience business. As of 2025, BP has been unable to sell the stake due to Russian government approval requirements and continues to carry it on its books at a nominal value while booking no income from it. This business — which sits across all segments and physically moves crude oil, refined products, LNG, and power across global markets — is one of BP's most underappreciated competitive advantages. The trading operation employs more than 3,000 people globally, operates 24 hours a day across multiple time zones, and generated what BP estimates as approximately $4 billion in cumulative additional value above the baseline for the company in 2024, though this figure is difficult to independently verify given the way trading results are embedded in segment reporting. The 1954 renaming to British Petroleum stripped some of the colonial framing, but the company's relationship with governments worldwide remained its primary competitive asset. The 1998 merger with Amoco and the 2000 acquisition of ARCO and Castrol transformed BP from a European major into a genuine global supermajor with deep U.S. Upstream positions. Shell's CEO Wael Sawan has explicitly prioritized shareholder returns and near-term cash generation over aggressive clean energy expansion, making the two companies increasingly convergent in strategy even as they diverge in scale. Beyond the supermajors, BP increasingly faces competition from national oil companies — particularly Saudi Aramco, which is the world's largest oil producer and the most profitable company on earth — and from emerging clean energy players. Those targets have since been substantially revised under Murray Auchincloss, with BP now guiding for oil and gas production of roughly 2.3 to 2.5 MMBOED through 2030 and reducing its annual low-carbon capital expenditure guidance. In the North Sea, BP's assets in the Shetland Islands (including the Clair field) and its Norwegian operations provide long-term low-decline production. This capability is built on decades of accumulated expertise, proprietary data infrastructure, and deep relationships with counterparties across the global energy value chain. This means accelerating development of its Gulf of Mexico deepwater portfolio — particularly the Kaskida and Tiber discoveries, which represent some of the largest untapped deepwater fields in the Gulf — while deferring or exiting offshore wind projects where returns have been below the company's 15% through-the-cycle return hurdle. Second, the company is growing its gas and LNG trading business, which management views as a natural bridge between the hydrocarbon era and the low-carbon future. The company is also developing green hydrogen projects in the UK and Germany, and its BP Pulse EV charging network had more than 100,000 charge points globally — a position that gives it optionality in the electric mobility transition. The British government's 1914 acquisition of a 51% stake at Churchill's urging was the defining event that locked BP into its peculiar existence as a semi-state oil company. The 1951 nationalization of its Iranian operations by Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh — and the subsequent CIA and MI6-backed coup that restored the Shah — represents the most consequential chapter in the company's history and a period BP has never fully reckoned with publicly. TotalEnergies, the French supermajor led by CEO Patrick Pouyanné, represents perhaps BP's most instructive competitive comparison. The underlying business is structurally unchanged. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was incorporated the following year to develop the find.