Amphenol Corporation vs Burlington Stores, Inc.: Strategic Comparison

This in-depth comparison examines Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc. across revenue, market value, business model, competitive positioning, and long-term growth strategy. Whether you are researching Amphenol Corporation on its own, evaluating Burlington Stores, Inc., or weighing the two companies side by side, the breakdown below highlights where each company leads and where the gap between Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc. is widest.

On the headline numbers, Amphenol Corporation reports annual revenue of $23.1B against $11.6B for Burlington Stores, Inc., while their respective market capitalizations stand at $170.0B and $15.2B. Amphenol Corporation is headquartered in United States and Burlington Stores, Inc. operates from United States, and those different home markets shape how each company competes.

Amphenol Corporation: This segment produces high-speed board-to-board and backplane connectors, I/O connectors, fiber optic interconnects, RF and microwave connectors, antennas, and cable assemblies primarily for the information technology and data communications market, mobile networks, mobile devices, automotive, and broadband communications. This segment specializes in connectors, cable assemblies, and interconnect systems designed to withstand extreme conditions of temperature, vibration, moisture, and electromagnetic interference, serving the defense, commercial aerospace, industrial, and automotive markets. The two-for-one stock split effected in June 2024 further enhanced stock liquidity. TE also maintains strong positions in industrial sensors, data connectivity, and medical devices, with a balanced geographic revenue mix of approximately 35% EMEA, 30% Asia-Pacific, and 30% Americas. RF and microwave specialists Huber+Suhner and Rosenberger contest 5G infrastructure, automotive RF, and test equipment markets where antenna and microwave performance are paramount. However, the race remains tight, and TE Connectivity's larger automotive franchise and deeper balance sheet provide significant defensive resources. The connector industry is also experiencing structural pressure from commoditization at the low end, where regional manufacturers in Asia compete primarily on price, forcing Amphenol to continuously migrate its portfolio toward higher-value, higher-margin products in harsh environments, high-speed data, and specialized sensors. The CommScope Mobile Networks acquisition added base station antenna and wireless infrastructure expertise. The pending CCS acquisition would add cable and connectivity solutions for broadband and enterprise networks. The acquisition pillar is the most visible and financially impactful. In automotive, Amphenol is targeting the electrification of everything, with high-voltage connectors and cable assemblies for EV powertrains, battery management systems, and charging infrastructure, as well as sensor and interconnect content for advanced driver assistance systems. In the depths of the Great Depression, when unemployment reached 25% and industrial production had collapsed by nearly half, Arthur J. Schmitt, a 39-year-old engineer and inventor from Chicago, filed a patent in August 1932 for a new radio tube socket made from a single piece of phenolic resin molded into a precise form. The socket was stronger, more efficient, and more reliable than the ceramic or stamped-metal alternatives that dominated the market, and despite costing more than competing products, it found immediate demand from radio manufacturers who needed components that could withstand the heat and electrical stress of vacuum tube technology. Schmitt's founding philosophy was deceptively simple yet profoundly influential: concentrate on manufacturing electronic components rather than elaborate assemblies, and never compromise on quality. The early years were lean but formative. The irony is, RCA became an enormous customer, ordering 10,000 sockets per day at a time when Amphenol's capacity was only 250 per day. The outbreak of World War II transformed Amphenol from a modest radio components supplier into a critical defense contractor.

Burlington Stores, Inc.: In 2022, Burlington Stores made a decision that many retail executives would have found professionally dangerous: it shut down its e-commerce operation and concentrated on physical off-price stores. The company calculated that online apparel returns and fulfillment costs worked against the off-price model, while stores let it preserve the treasure-hunt economics that drive impulse purchasing. That decision looks much less strange after fiscal 2025. Burlington reported $11.57 billion in total revenue, up 9% from fiscal 2024, with net income of $610.2 million. The chain ended the year with 1,212 stores and continues to remodel the business around smaller boxes, sharper buying, disciplined inventory turns, and lower occupancy costs. Founded in 1972 by Monroe Milstein as Burlington Coat Factory in Burlington, New Jersey, the company spent its first few decades as a large-format off-price outerwear retailer. The modern Burlington is broader and more operationally disciplined, competing most directly with TJX and Ross Stores for off-price apparel, home, and seasonal merchandise.

Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc. pursue distinct approaches to generating revenue, and understanding how each company operates is the foundation of any fair comparison between Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc..

Amphenol Corporation business model: The engineering depth behind this pricing power is staggering: Amphenol holds industry-standard positions in military-specification connectors (the '5015 AN' connector became known in WWII maintenance crews simply as 'the Amphenol connector'), in data bus systems for military aircraft (the MIL-STD-1553B Data Bus, introduced in 1982, remains standard on the Eurofighter Typhoon), and in high-speed interconnects for AI data centers where the company is deploying 224Gbps connector technologies to meet surging demand.

Burlington Stores, Inc. business model: Burlington makes money through an off-price retail model that buys branded apparel, home goods, and seasonal merchandise opportunistically, then sells those goods through physical stores at meaningful discounts to department-store prices. The model depends on fast buying, disciplined inventory turns, pack-away logistics, low occupancy costs, and a treasure-hunt shopping experience that drives impulse purchases. By avoiding e-commerce fulfillment and focusing on smaller stores, Burlington reduces return and shipping costs while using compare-at pricing and branded inventory to preserve value perception and gross margin.

The durability of a company's moat often decides long-term winners. Here is how the competitive advantages of Amphenol Corporation stack up against those of Burlington Stores, Inc..

Amphenol Corporation competitive advantage: Third, the company's products are typically designed into customer platforms during the early development phase, creating high switching costs once qualified — automotive platforms, military aircraft, and data center servers have lifecycles of 5 – 10 years or more, generating recurring revenue from production volumes and aftermarket spare parts. The global connector and interconnect systems market is a fragmented, $90 – 100 billion industry dominated by a handful of large-scale players and hundreds of specialized regional manufacturers, with the top 10 companies controlling an increasing share of total revenue as consolidation accelerates. Japanese giants Yazaki and Sumitomo Electric dominate wire harnesses and vehicle connectors through scale, cost control, and incumbent OEM relationships across Japanese and global automotive platforms. Amphenol Corporation's single most defensible competitive moat is its decentralized, entrepreneurial operating model combined with a 93-year accumulation of engineering expertise in high-reliability interconnect systems that has created switching costs so high that major OEMs in aerospace, defense, automotive, and data centers effectively cannot change suppliers without risking platform certification, safety approvals, and years of qualification work. This moat is not merely theoretical — it is quantified in the company's financial results. Each acquisition not only adds revenue but also deepens the switching costs for existing customers, who find that Amphenol can now supply an ever-broader range of their interconnect needs from a single qualified supplier. This is a moat that TE Connectivity, despite its larger historical scale, cannot replicate in under five years because it would require not just capital but the same 93 years of accumulated customer trust, military qualification, and decentralized operational culture that Amphenol has built since Arthur J. Schmitt molded his first phenolic radio tube socket in a Chicago workshop in 1932. By 1936, Amphenol had introduced two products that became industry standards: the 75 series uniform microphone connector and a lock-in socket for radio tubes.

Burlington Stores, Inc. competitive advantage: The company's journey from the brink of irrelevance to record profitability provides a masterclass in operational discipline, demonstrating that even the most traditional brick-and-mortar models can achieve massive scale and profitability when unit economics are rigorously enforced and consumer demand is genuinely aligned with the value proposition. The company's ability to control the entire value chain, from the initial vendor negotiation to the final point-of-sale transaction, allows it to capture margins that are traditionally fragmented across multiple independent entities in the retail sector, creating a moat that is incredibly difficult for traditional department stores to replicate without completely abandoning their franchise agreements and promotional structures. This ability to decouple the purchase date from the sell-through date gives Burlington a massive advantage over traditional retailers who are forced to buy inventory exactly when it is needed, often at peak wholesale prices. By owning the customer relationship from the moment they walk through the doors to the final receipt, Burlington has built a moat that is incredibly difficult for traditional department stores to replicate without completely dismantling their existing promotional calendars and supply chain commitments. This data-driven approach to inventory allocation is incredibly difficult for legacy department stores to replicate because they are locked into forward-buying commitments and rigid promotional calendars, giving Burlington a structural cost advantage that allows it to undercut traditional retailers on price while still maintaining higher profit margins per unit. The company's ability to control the entire value chain, from the initial opportunistic bid to the final point-of-sale transaction, allows it to capture margins that are traditionally fragmented across multiple independent entities in the retail sector, creating a moat that is incredibly difficult for traditional department stores to replicate without completely dismantling their existing franchise agreements and physical infrastructure. This data-driven approach to inventory management is incredibly difficult for legacy retailers to replicate because they lack the decentralized buying infrastructure and the pack-away logistics network to process this volume of opportunistic inventory, giving Burlington a structural cost advantage that allows it to undercut traditional retailers on price while still maintaining higher profit margins per unit. TJX possesses a massive structural advantage in its global buying organization, which has decades of entrenched relationships with premium European and American brands, allowing it to secure the highest-quality opportunistic inventory before Burlington's buyers even see it. However, TJX's model is heavily weighted toward home goods and accessories, whereas Burlington maintains a distinct advantage in its core competency: branded family apparel and outerwear. Burlington's aggressive transition to the 25,000-square-foot small-box format allows it to achieve higher sales per square foot in secondary and tertiary markets where TJX's larger 30,000-square-foot boxes cannot pencil out financially, giving Burlington a structural real estate advantage in suburban and exurban communities. Despite this intense competition, Burlington maintains a distinct advantage in its 'pack-away' logistics network, which allows it to purchase off-season apparel at rock-bottom prices and store it for up to a year, ensuring that the company never has to take destructive markdowns on its core inventory, a capability that Ross and TJX use but Burlington has optimized to an extreme degree due to its historical roots in seasonal outerwear. Burlington's data analytics provide a superior allocation mechanism, as its national scale gives it access to a massive dataset of localized transaction trends, allowing it to route specific sizes, colors, and brands to the exact store clusters where they will sell fastest, minimizing the need for localized clearance racks and reducing the days to sell, directly impacting the company's gross profit per unit. The company's ability to control the entire value chain, from the initial opportunistic bid to the final point-of-sale transaction, allows it to capture margins that are traditionally fragmented across multiple independent entities in the retail sector, creating a moat that is incredibly difficult for traditional department stores to replicate without completely dismantling their existing promotional calendars and physical infrastructure, a process that would take years and cost billions of dollars. These traditional off-price players have a significant structural advantage: they have decades of entrenched relationships with major brands and can often secure the highest-quality opportunistic inventory before Burlington's buyers even see it, limiting the company's access to premium branded goods and forcing it to rely more heavily on lower-tier labels or unbranded commodities. If these dominant groups successfully use their scale to lock up exclusive liquidation contracts with major department stores and apparel manufacturers, they could erode Burlington's merchandise mix in key metropolitan areas, particularly among affluent consumers who demand premium brands at discounted prices. The company's exposure to middle-income consumers, combined with the potential for tariff hikes and intense competitive pressure from larger off-price groups, creates a challenging environment that requires Burlington to continuously innovate and optimize its operations to maintain its competitive advantage and protect its profit margins, ensuring that it can continue to generate massive free cash flow and maintain its dominant position in the off-price retail sector. Burlington Stores' single unreplicable moat is its highly decentralized, opportunistic buying organization combined with its aggressive transition to the 25,000-square-foot small-box real estate format, a competitive advantage that competitors cannot replicate in under five years because it requires a complete teardown of legacy supply chain commitments and a massive real estate portfolio restructuring. Burlington's small boxes are designed solely for high-turnover treasure hunts, achieving economies of scale in occupancy costs that legacy retailers simply cannot match, allowing the company to secure prime locations in open-air power centers at a fraction of the cost of enclosed malls, reducing the average rent per square foot by over 30 percent and creating a structural cost advantage that allows it to undercut traditional retailers on price while still maintaining higher profit margins per unit. But the true unreplicable advantage is the company's complete abandonment of e-commerce, a highly contrarian strategic decision that eliminated the toxic unit economics of online apparel sales, which are plagued by 30-percent-plus return rates, exorbitant picking and packing costs, and massive reverse logistics expenses. Building an opportunistic buying network of this scale requires navigating complex global vendor relationships, securing massive warehouse lines of credit, and building proprietary allocation models based on millions of data points, a process that would take legacy department stores years and billions of dollars to replicate, if they could do it at all without abandoning their franchise agreements and completely restructuring their promotional calendars. This automation initiative will further widen the company's cost advantage over traditional department stores and allow it to process even higher volumes of opportunistic inventory without a proportional increase in fixed overhead, creating a highly efficient logistics network that drastically reduces the labor hours required to process pack-away goods compared to a traditional retail distribution center. Burlington Stores' specific bet for the next three years is the aggressive acceleration of its small-box real estate expansion and the complete penetration of secondary and tertiary suburban markets, a strategic initiative that could add billions in high-margin retail sales while simultaneously reducing the company's overall occupancy cost structure and widening its competitive moat.

Future prospects matter as much as current results. The growth strategies below explain how Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc. each plan to expand from here.

Amphenol Corporation growth strategy: This segment focuses on sensor technologies, value-added cable assemblies, and specialized interconnect products for automotive, industrial, IT datacom, and medical applications. This model has proven particularly effective in the company's acquisition strategy, where Amphenol typically acquires 5 – 10 specialized companies annually, integrates them into the existing operating structure, and drives margin improvement through operational excellence and cross-selling opportunities. The irony is, Amphenol's strategy to win this competition relies on three levers: first, its acquisition engine, which adds specialized capabilities faster than organic R&D alone could achieve; second, its decentralized manufacturing footprint, which provides proximity to OEMs and shorter lead times; and third, its engineering-led culture, which prioritizes custom solutions and design-in intimacy over commodity volume. The company's FY2025 results suggest this strategy is working — its 91% growth in Communications Solutions significantly outpaced TE's reported growth rates, and its 31.1% operating margin in that segment indicates strong pricing power in high-demand AI interconnect products. This growth was driven by solid organic expansion in the Communications Solutions segment, strong organic growth in Harsh Environment Solutions and Interconnect and Sensor Systems, and significant contributions from the acquisition program, particularly the integration of Carlisle Interconnect Technologies and CommScope's Mobile Networks business (Andrew). Days sales outstanding and inventory turnover metrics remained stable, indicating disciplined receivables and inventory management despite rapid revenue growth. If integration execution falters, if combined benefits fail to materialize, or if end-market demand softens before the deal closes, Amphenol could face a prolonged period of margin compression and balance sheet strain that would jeopardize its acquisition-driven growth model. Amphenol Corporation's growth strategy rests on three interconnected pillars that have been refined over decades and are now executing with particular intensity: strategic bolt-on acquisitions, organic technology development in high-growth end markets, and geographic and market diversification. Since 2017, Amphenol has completed more than 30 acquisitions, averaging 5 – 10 deals per year, with a disciplined focus on companies that add specialized technology, deepen customer relationships in target end markets, and can be integrated into the decentralized operating model within 12 – 24 months. The organic technology development pillar focuses on three high-growth vectors: AI data center interconnects, where the company is deploying 224Gbps solutions and developing 448Gbps technologies for next-generation AI clusters; automotive electrification, where high-voltage connectors, battery interconnects, and charging infrastructure components are seeing 15%+ demand growth; and defense modernization, where the CIT acquisition and ongoing R&D are positioning Amphenol for next-generation communications, space, and hypersonic programs. This diversification insulates Amphenol from single-market downturns while providing multiple avenues for growth. The company also continues to expand its manufacturing footprint in Southeast Asia and India to reduce China concentration and meet regional content requirements. Management's stated goal is to grow organic revenue at 1.5 – 2x the rate of the overall connector market while adding 2 – 4% annual growth through acquisitions, a formula that has produced the 35% three-year revenue CAGR from FY2023 to FY2025. Beyond the CCS integration, Amphenol is investing heavily in next-generation interconnect technologies for AI data centers, including 224Gbps and eventually 448Gbps copper and optical interconnect solutions that will be required for the next wave of AI training and inference clusters. The company is also expanding its sensor portfolio — evidenced by the August 2025 acquisition of Rochester Sensors and the ongoing integration of MTS Systems acquired in 2021 for $1.7 billion — to capture demand from industrial automation, medical devices, and robotics where reliable sensor-interconnect integration is critical. The company's geographic diversification strategy continues, with Southeast Asia and India emerging as important manufacturing hubs to complement its established presence in China, the US, and Europe. Management has signaled continued 'strategic bolt-on acquisitions' at a pace of 5 – 10 companies annually, with the M&A pipeline focused on sensors, high-voltage EV components, high-speed interconnects, and aerospace/defense specialties. The capital allocation framework remains disciplined: maintain investment-grade credit ratings, fund organic growth and M&A, and return excess cash to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases. Co. In 1923 with $5,000 and a partner named Walter Horn, producing bakelite sockets for radio tubes, but that venture had struggled during the Depression and Schmitt had left after a merger dispute. In 1967, Amphenol was acquired by Bunker-Ramo Corporation, beginning a period of corporate ownership that would see the company pass through Allied Corporation in 1981 and a leveraged buyout by LPL Technologies in 1987.

Burlington Stores, Inc. growth strategy: This agility, combined with a zero-advertising marketing strategy that relies entirely on the psychological draw of the 'treasure hunt,' creates a highly efficient customer acquisition model that traditional retailers cannot replicate without completely dismantling their existing promotional calendars and supply chain commitments. The transformation of Burlington from a debt-laden, inefficient warehouse operator to a highly profitable, cash-generating small-box powerhouse fundamentally alters the competitive landscape of the off-price retail industry, forcing legacy players to accelerate their own real estate improvement efforts or risk obsolescence. Burlington has built a highly sophisticated 'pack-away' inventory strategy. By killing the digital channel, Burlington eliminated millions of dollars in fulfillment costs and redirected that capital toward opening 100 new small-box physical stores annually, a strategy that has driven comparable store sales growth and expanded the company's total addressable market in suburban and exurban communities. Ross has mastered the art of extreme SG&A discipline, operating stores with minimal fixtures and zero advertising, a strategy that Burlington has closely mirrored under the leadership of CEO Michael O'Sullivan, who brought the Ross playbook with him when he joined Burlington in 2019. The competitive landscape is shifting rapidly, with traditional department stores like Macy's and Kohl's attempting to launch their own off-price concepts (such as Macy's Backstage) to capture the trade-down effect. Burlington's head start in abandoning e-commerce and focusing entirely on the high-margin, low-cost brick-and-mortar treasure hunt, combined with its aggressive small-box expansion, gives it a significant lead that will be incredibly difficult for legacy department stores to overcome without completely cannibalizing their own full-price businesses. This top-line growth was driven by a massive acceleration in new store openings, with the company adding over 100 net new small-box locations, combined with positive comparable store sales growth and an expansion in average ticket size as consumers traded down from traditional department stores. The company's operating cash flow also reached record levels, allowing it to aggressively fund its capital expenditure program for new store buildouts while simultaneously executing massive share repurchase programs, reducing the diluted share count and driving adjusted EPS to record highs. The company must navigate this complex macroeconomic environment while continuing to grow its store count, a delicate balance that requires strict adherence to real estate discipline and a deep understanding of the evolving consumer landscape. Burlington, however, operates a reactive, opportunistic buying engine that purchases inventory continuously throughout the year, capitalizing on manufacturer overruns, canceled orders, and seasonal liquidations with a seven-day turnaround from purchase to store floor, allowing it to acquire premium branded goods at rock-bottom prices without the risk of forward-commitment obsolescence. By killing the digital channel, Burlington captured the high-margin impulse purchases of the physical treasure hunt, ensuring that a customer who walks into the store to buy a single discounted coat ends up leaving with five additional items they didn't know they needed, expanding the company's average ticket size and capturing profits that traditional omnichannel retailers must sacrifice to the fulfillment center. Burlington Stores' growth strategy is anchored by three specific, named initiatives with clear targets: the acceleration of the 25,000-square-foot small-box rollout, the automation of regional distribution centers to reduce processing labor by 25 percent, and the aggressive expansion into non-apparel categories like pet supplies and home goods, a comprehensive plan that is designed to drive top-line growth while simultaneously expanding margins and widening the company's competitive moat. The first initiative, Project SmallBox, aims to open 100 new net stores annually through 2028, targeting suburban and exurban power centers that have been abandoned by traditional big-box retailers. By offering a highly curated treasure hunt experience in a low-occupancy-cost environment, Burlington aims to capture the discretionary spend that is currently lost to online retailers or distant regional malls, expanding its total addressable market and creating a more diversified geographic footprint that is less sensitive to localized economic shocks. The second initiative, Project AutoSort, focuses on the deployment of automated distribution technology, partnering with leading robotics firms to install automated sortation systems, AI-driven quality control scanners, and robotic palletizing units in its top regional distribution hubs, with the target of reducing the average processing time per unit from 48 hours to 36 hours by Q4 2027, a 25 percent reduction that will directly impact gross profit per unit and create a structural cost advantage that is incredibly difficult for legacy players to replicate. The third initiative is the expansion into non-apparel categories, specifically targeting the high-growth pet supplies and home decor markets. By using its existing opportunistic buying infrastructure to acquire distressed lots of premium pet food, toys, and home accessories, Burlington aims to increase the average basket size of its core customer base by 15 percent over the next three years, expanding its national footprint and capturing market share in categories where legacy retailers have a weak presence and consumers are highly receptive to the convenience of discounted branded goods. Honestly, these three initiatives are designed to drive top-line growth while simultaneously expanding margins, ensuring that the company can continue to increase its net income even as the overall apparel market stabilizes and competition from larger off-price groups intensifies. Simultaneously, the company is investing heavily in the automation of its distribution centers, deploying advanced robotics and AI-driven sorting systems to automate the processing of opportunistic pack-away inventory, with the goal of reducing the labor hours required to process a single unit of apparel by an additional 25 percent over the next three years, a massive operational improvement that will further widen the company's cost advantage over traditional department stores and allow it to process even higher volumes of distressed inventory without a proportional increase in fixed overhead. This automation initiative involves partnering with leading logistics firms to install automated sortation systems, AI-driven diagnostic bays for quality control, and robotic palletizing units in its top regional distribution hubs, targeting a reduction in the average processing time per unit from 48 hours to 36 hours, a 25 percent reduction that will directly impact gross profit per vehicle and create a structural cost advantage that is incredibly difficult for legacy players to replicate. Burlington is expanding its merchandise mix beyond traditional apparel, specifically targeting the high-growth pet supplies and home decor categories, which share similar consumer purchasing behaviors and offer higher margin profiles than basic commodity apparel. By using its existing opportunistic buying infrastructure to acquire distressed lots of premium pet food, toys, and home accessories, Burlington aims to increase the average basket size of its core customer base, creating a massive, cross-category platform that can capture a larger share of the middle-income consumer's discretionary wallet. The company's ability to execute on these three strategic initiatives, expanding the small-box footprint, automating the distribution network, and diversifying the merchandise mix, will be critical to its long-term success and its ability to maintain its dominant position in the off-price retail sector, as it faces increasing competition from larger off-price giants and legacy department stores attempting to launch their own value concepts. He envisioned a completely different way to sell apparel: a direct-to-consumer warehouse experience where customers could browse massive inventories of branded goods at 20 to 60 percent below retail, a vision that was initially incubated in a single location before expanding rapidly across the Northeast. The first major milestone came in the 1980s when the company expanded beyond outerwear into year-round family apparel, transforming from a seasonal niche player into a national off-price powerhouse. The IPO marked a turning point for Burlington, as it transitioned from a private equity portfolio company to an independent, publicly traded enterprise with access to public capital markets, allowing it to build out its massive centralized distribution network and develop the proprietary technology that powers its inventory allocation engine.

A closer look at the financial trajectory of Amphenol Corporation and Burlington Stores, Inc. rounds out the comparison.

Amphenol Corporation: Amphenol reported FY2025 net sales of $23.1 billion, up 52% year over year, and net income of $4.3 billion. Communications Solutions became the largest segment as AI data-center and IT datacom demand accelerated, while Harsh Environment Solutions and Interconnect and Sensor Systems added defense, aerospace, industrial, automotive, medical, and sensor diversification. Operating income reached $5.9 billion, or 25.4% of net sales, showing how scale and mix expansion flowed through margins.

Burlington Stores, Inc.: Burlington's revenue has grown steadily through the post-pandemic normalization: $9.7 billion in fiscal 2023, $10.6 billion in fiscal 2024, and $11.57 billion in fiscal 2025. Net income rose to $610.2 million in fiscal 2025, helped by comparable-store growth, new stores, and continued discipline in the off-price operating model. The key operating story is scale without e-commerce complexity. Burlington generated more than 99% of net sales through stores and ended fiscal 2025 with 1,212 locations, while using opportunistic buying, pack-away inventory, and smaller-store economics to defend margins against larger peers such as TJX and Ross.