1911, New York: Charles Ranlett Flint orchestrated the merger of four companies — a time recording business, a tabulating machine company, a computing scale company, and a dial recorder manufacturer — into the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company. The combination was financial engineering rather than strategic vision; Flint was a conglomerate builder who saw industrial scale as its own justification. Thomas J. Watson Sr. Joined CTR in 1914 with a mandate to build a sales organization. He renamed the company International Business Machines in 1924 — a name that projected ambition beyond the product lines it actually sold. Watson's obsession with sales culture, training, and customer relationships created the IBM that corporations recognized and trusted for the next half century. The IBM Personal Computer in 1981 was both a triumph and a strategic error. IBM entered the personal computer market and defined the dominant hardware architecture, but outsourced the operating system to Microsoft and the microprocessor to Intel — retaining none of the software intellectual property that would generate most of the industry's value for the next four decades. The PC succeeded. IBM's share of the PC's economic value approached zero. The 1993 crisis — $8 billion in losses, calls for breakup from major shareholders and analysts — forced a reckoning that produced the services transformation. The Red Hat acquisition in 2019 was the next defining bet: $34 billion for a company whose open-source enterprise software business had revenue of approximately $3.4 billion. The multiple was large. The strategic necessity was clear.