Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc.: Strategic Comparison
Key Differences at a Glance
| Field | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $59.4B | $56.7B |
| Founded | 2004 | 1984 |
| Employees | 170,000 | 86,200 |
| Market Cap | $120.0B | $466.0B |
| Headquarters | Belgium | United States |
Quick Stats Comparison
| Metric | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $59.4B | $56.7B |
| Founded | 2004 | 1984 |
| Headquarters | Leuven, Belgium | San Jose, California |
| Market Cap | $120.0B | $466.0B |
| Employees | 170,000 | 86,200 |
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV Revenue vs Cisco Systems, Inc. Revenue — Year by Year
| Year | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Leader |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | N/A | $56.7B | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 2024 | N/A | $53.8B | Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 2023 | $59.4B | $57.0B | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV |
| 2022 | $55.2B | $51.6B | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV |
| 2021 | $54.3B | $49.8B | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV |
Business Model Breakdown
Overview: Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc.
This in-depth comparison examines Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. across revenue, market value, business model, competitive positioning, and long-term growth strategy. Whether you are researching Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV on its own, evaluating Cisco Systems, Inc., or weighing the two companies side by side, the breakdown below highlights where each company leads and where the gap between Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. is widest.
On the headline numbers, Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV reports annual revenue of $59.4B against $56.7B for Cisco Systems, Inc., while their respective market capitalizations stand at $120.0B and $466.0B. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV is headquartered in Belgium and Cisco Systems, Inc. operates from United States, and those different home markets shape how each company competes.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV: The entity that owns it today — Anheuser-Busch InBev — was assembled mostly between 2004 and 2016 through two of the largest acquisitions in corporate history. Applied to beer, this produced a portfolio spanning Budweiser, Corona, Stella Artois, Modelo, Beck's, and Hoegaarden — brands across every price tier and geography, managed with a ruthlessness about overhead that legacy brewery operators could not match. What makes AB InBev's financial structure genuinely unusual is how it manages its relationship with 3 million retail points of sale. The gap between potential and actual margin is largely explained by interest expense on the debt accumulated during the Anheuser-Busch and SABMiller acquisitions, which still runs into the billions annually despite years of paydown. Corona and Modelo account for 40 percent of revenue but generate gross margins exceeding 60 percent, compared to 35 percent for core lagers like Budweiser. The merger that created InBev in 2004 joined Interbrew — itself an assembler of Belgian and Central European breweries — with Brazilian brewer AmBev, a 3G Capital vehicle that had already demonstrated what cost discipline could do to beer margins. The Anheuser-Busch board initially rejected the offer. 3G Capital then applied its zero-based budgeting approach to the merged entity, cutting costs that had accumulated over decades of comfortable domestic monopoly. Den Hoorn in 1366 made beer for a local market. AB InBev today manages that same brewing heritage across 50 countries, optimizing for margin per hectoliter. SABMiller, the second-largest brewer globally, was too obvious to ignore.
Cisco Systems, Inc.: Cisco Systems commands such an overwhelming share of enterprise networking infrastructure that its routers and switches have become as invisible and essential as the electrical wiring inside office walls. Fiscal year 2025 marked a turning point in this transformation. But Cisco's transformation comes with real costs. Its installed base of millions of networking devices gives it unmatched telemetry data and customer relationships. The Networking segment remains the largest, encompassing enterprise switches (Catalyst and Nexus families), routers, wireless access points (Meraki), and software-defined WAN solutions. This segment generates approximately 55-60% of total revenue and carries the highest gross margins in the portfolio, typically above 65% on a non-GAAP basis. Cisco's differentiation here lies in enterprise-grade security, hybrid deployment options, and deep integration with its networking infrastructure for quality-of-service improvement. Approximately 85% of Cisco's revenue flows through resellers, distributors, and system integrators. Profitability remains a hallmark of Cisco's model. The AI infrastructure opportunity represents Cisco's newest revenue vector. These orders encompass high-performance networking switches (Silicon One-based platforms), optics, and fabric solutions designed for GPU cluster interconnection in AI training and inference workloads. Understanding this competitive terrain requires examining each major battleground separately. In data center networking, Arista Networks has emerged as Cisco's most significant rival. Aruba has gained traction with its AI-powered network management platform and competitive wireless access points, particularly among mid-market enterprises seeking simpler alternatives to Cisco's complex portfolio. The cybersecurity market presents an even more fragmented competitive landscape. Despite these competitive pressures, Cisco's aggregate market position remains strong. Gross margins remained healthy throughout FY2025, with non-GAAP gross margins ranging from 67-68% across quarters. For FY2026, Cisco guided to $59-60 billion initially, later raised to $61.2-61.7 billion after strong Q2 results showed accelerating demand across all geographies and customer segments. The cloud computing shift presents a structural headwind that Cisco has only partially addressed. Each dollar of enterprise IT spending that moves to the cloud represents a potential reduction in Cisco's addressable market for traditional hardware. The first and most powerful is its massive installed base. No other vendor can offer a complete networking stack from campus access switches to data center spine-leaf fabrics, from SD-WAN edge routers to cloud security platforms, from collaboration tools to observability software — all managed through integrated policy engines and telemetry platforms. When a customer buys Cisco networking, they gain access to integrated security (Secure Firewall embedded in switches), analytics (DNA Center), and now observability (Splunk) — all sharing context and telemetry that improves each component's effectiveness. The second pillar is security platform consolidation. The bull case for Cisco rests on three converging tailwinds. Second, a massive campus networking refresh cycle is underway as enterprises upgrade aging infrastructure to support Wi-Fi 7, IoT proliferation, and zero-trust security architectures. Cisco's Q2 FY2026 results showed networking product orders accelerating above 20% year over year, suggesting this refresh cycle has significant runway. The bear case centers on margin pressure and competitive displacement. The two were married, and their offices sat on opposite ends of Stanford's sprawling campus. They wanted their respective computer networks to communicate with each other — a seemingly simple desire that proved technically impossible with existing technology. This router — essentially a specialized computer running sophisticated software — could connect any network to any other network, regardless of the underlying protocols each used. Bosack and Lerner recognized the commercial potential of this technology. The early years were bootstrapped and precarious. Cisco shipped its first commercial router in 1986, and the timing proved perfect. In 1987, Cisco received venture capital funding from Sequoia Capital, with Don Valentine joining the board. Valentine's involvement would prove far-reaching — and traumatic. In 1990, shortly after Cisco's successful IPO on the NASDAQ, Sandy Lerner was fired. Leonard Bosack resigned in solidarity.
Business Models: How Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. Make Money
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. pursue distinct approaches to generating revenue, and understanding how each company operates is the foundation of any fair comparison between Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc..
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV business model: This negative cash conversion cycle means AB InBev sells and collects cash for inventory before it has to pay its suppliers, generating billions in free float that is deployed into debt reduction or new brewery construction. Outside the traditional brewers, Diageo and Pernod Ricard pose a growing threat to the premium segment, capturing an estimated 25% of the high-margin night-time occasion share through aggressive pricing and next-day delivery of spirits. Here's why: in 1999, Interbrew merged with Brazil's AmBev to form InBev, a concept that centralized slow-moving inventory in a single location to feed surrounding 'spoke' branches via a dedicated delivery fleet. This velocity is monetized through the BEES digital ordering application, which integrates directly into the inventory management workflows of informal retailers, creating high switching costs and locking in recurring daily revenue streams that are virtually immune to competitor poaching. The company typically negotiates 90-day payment terms with its agricultural suppliers, meaning it receives the barley and hops, brews the beer, sells it to the retailer via BEES, and collects the cash before it has to pay the farmer. Outside the traditional brewers, Diageo and Constellation Brands pose a growing threat to the premium segment, capturing an estimated 25% of the high-margin night-time occasion share through aggressive pricing and next-day delivery of spirits and RTDs. Both companies have massive scale, extensive marketing budgets, and the ability to offer aggressive pricing on high-margin spirits and RTDs. However, the independent craft brewers are increasingly struggling to compete with the scale, pricing, and distribution availability of the global chains. The 4.2% increase in revenue per hectoliter was proof of the company's ability to drive pricing power and increase average ticket sizes through effective premiumization, targeted promotions, and the continuous expansion of its super-premium product offerings. The continuous expansion of the premium product offerings is driven by the feedback loop provided by the BEES platform. These formulations will use advanced dealcoholization technologies, including vacuum distillation and reverse osmosis, to ensure that the No/Low products maintain the exact flavor profile and mouthfeel of their full-strength counterparts. The global conglomerates' massive scale allowed them to negotiate better pricing from agricultural suppliers, which they passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, putting intense pressure on the local brewers' margins. The 2023 Bud Light controversy complicated the U.S. Picture — the domestic market's volume declines represented a meaningful headwind that partially offset the pricing-driven gains elsewhere.
Cisco Systems, Inc. business model: While this segment faced headwinds as pandemic-era demand normalized, it generates approximately $4-5 billion annually through a combination of hardware (room systems, phones, headsets) and software subscriptions. Cisco's revenue model has shifted dramatically toward subscriptions. FY2025 non-GAAP gross margins of approximately 65-68% reflect the company's pricing power and the high software content in its solutions. Non-GAAP operating margins typically range from 32-35%, though GAAP margins are lower due to acquisition-related amortization and restructuring charges. The company's transformation under CEO Chuck Robbins — from a hardware-centric box seller to a software-and-subscription platform company — represents one of the most significant strategic shift in technology industry history. This margin resilience reflects Cisco's pricing power, increasing software mix, and operational efficiency improvements. Operating margins on a non-GAAP basis hovered around 32-35%, while GAAP operating margins were compressed to approximately 20-21% due to acquisition-related charges. Companies like Arista Networks have built multi-billion-dollar businesses by offering simpler, more performant switches at lower price points, eroding Cisco's premium pricing power in data center networking. This brand premium allows Cisco to maintain pricing discipline even as competitors offer technically comparable products at lower price points. The third pillar is the subscription and ARR expansion. Cisco is systematically converting its installed base from one-time hardware purchases to recurring software subscriptions through offerings like DNA Advantage licenses, Meraki cloud management, and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) bundles. As Cisco shifts toward software subscriptions, the transition creates near-term revenue headwinds as perpetual license revenue converts to lower annual subscription payments (though with higher lifetime value). Stanford initially claimed ownership of the router technology, leading to tense negotiations that ultimately resulted in a royalty-free license for Cisco to use the technology commercially — Stanford received no equity stake, a decision the university would later regret as Cisco's value soared into the billions.
Competitive Advantage: Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc.
The durability of a company's moat often decides long-term winners. Here is how the competitive advantages of Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV stack up against those of Cisco Systems, Inc..
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV competitive advantage: The financial architecture of the business is built on a self-reinforcing flywheel where procurement scale drives margin expansion, which funds debt reduction from the SABMiller acquisition, which frees up capital to invest in the BEES digital ecosystem. As the global brewing industry transitions from a volume-growth paradigm to a value-growth paradigm, AB InBev is not merely reacting; it is preemptively retooling its manufacturing base to handle the complex formulations of hard seltzers, alcoholic kombuchas, and zero-alcohol craft simulations, ensuring its production moat remains uncrossable. Heineken's superior scale in the European on-premise channel also presents a long-term geographic threat, as AB InBev's footprint in Western Europe remains fragmented, limiting its ability to capture the rapidly growing craft and specialty beer segment. However, these spirits manufacturers completely lack the massive brewing infrastructure, the B2B BEES platform, and the global agricultural procurement scale required to service the high-volume core beer segment, which represents the most defensible cash-cow segment of the beverage market. This initiative targets a 15% increase in African retailer order frequency and a 20% reduction in stockouts, further cementing the high switching costs that protect AB InBev's most valuable emerging market revenue stream. The company's primary competitive advantage is its BEES B2B platform, which fulfills 85% of emerging market orders within 24 hours, creating insurmountable switching costs for independent retailers. The company's proprietary Corona and Modelo brands account for 30% of unit sales but generate gross margins exceeding 60%, creating a structural profit advantage that national brands cannot match. This financial architecture creates a compounding advantage: as AB InBev grows, its purchasing leverage increases, allowing it to extend payment terms even further, which generates more free float, which funds more debt reduction and brewery openings. AB InBev sits at the apex of this transition, using its massive scale to dictate terms to tier-one agricultural manufacturers while using its BEES network to service the 30 million independent retailers that perform 70% of all global beverage sales. By shifting the sales mix toward these premium products, AB InBev extracts an additional 1500 basis points of gross profit on every dollar of revenue, a structural advantage that directly funds its aggressive debt reduction program and global marketing spend. If AB InBev's #1 revenue stream — the BEES B2B distribution network — were to disappear tomorrow, the company would lose its primary growth engine and its most sticky customer base, forcing an immediate reversion to a pure wholesale distributor model that would compress gross margins by 800 basis points and eliminate the logistical moat that justifies its premium valuation. This deep software integration creates a massive switching cost; if a retailer decides to switch from AB InBev to Heineken, they must retrain their entire staff on a new ordering interface, lose their accumulated BEES credit limit, and risk the operational downtime associated with learning a new system. More importantly, the micro-lending process guarantees that the retailer remains dependent on the BEES ecosystem for their working capital needs, providing an additional touchpoint to sell premium brands, coolers, and point-of-sale marketing materials. Additionally, the procurement desk drives supply chain certainty; by locking in the price of aluminum cans and malted barley years in advance, AB InBev insulates its 32.4% EBITDA margin from the volatile commodity spikes that periodically devastate the margins of smaller, regional brewers who lack the scale to hedge effectively. The massive breweries also benefit from extreme economies of scale in utilities, labor, and packaging, reducing per-hectoliter production costs by 40% compared to smaller facilities. This massive scale gives AB InBev significant leverage in negotiating payment terms, volume rebates, and cooperative marketing funds. This margin advantage funds the continuous reinvestment in the BEES network, the aggressive debt reduction program, and the expansion of the super-premium product offerings, creating a self-reinforcing flywheel that drives long-term shareholder value. Heineken, with over 160 breweries, remains the market leader in total European footprint and dominates the premium on-premise channel through its 300+ location network, a geographic advantage AB InBev has yet to meaningfully challenge outside of its core Americas markets. Carlsberg's inability to optimize its geopolitical footprint left it unable to match AB InBev's global scale, resulting in a mass exodus of institutional investors to AB InBev and Heineken. Heineken's ZBB cost culture lags behind AB InBev's, meaning it does not enjoy the same structural margin advantage that funds AB InBev's continuous reinvestment. However, both companies completely lack the massive brewing infrastructure, the B2B BEES platform, and the global agricultural procurement scale required to service the high-volume core beer segment. AB InBev has acquired several prominent craft brewers over the years, including Goose Island, Elysian, and Wicked Weed, integrating them into its premium portfolio and using its scale to improve their margins. The competitive dynamics of the global brewing market are shaped by the fundamental tension between scale and localization. The global chains like AB InBev and Heineken benefit from massive economies of scale in purchasing, distribution, and marketing, allowing them to offer lower prices and wider inventory availability. AB InBev has managed to navigate this tension successfully by combining the scale of a global chain with the localized execution of the BEES platform. Its megabreweries provide the scale and inventory availability required to service the global market, while its BEES platform and DSD fleets provide the localized service and credit availability that informal retailers demand. This unique combination of global scale and localized digital execution is the key to AB InBev's competitive advantage, and it is the reason the company has been able to consistently outperform its peers in both revenue growth and profitability. The physical footprint of the DSD network is also a significant barrier to entry. The zero-based budgeting (ZBB) culture is the second layer of AB InBev's competitive moat. AB InBev's competitive advantage is not just about being faster or cheaper; it is about creating a self-reinforcing ecosystem where digital superiority drives market share, which drives purchasing scale, which drives ZBB cost extraction, which drives margin expansion, which funds further digital investment. They realized that they could not outspend the global giants on mass marketing, and they could not compete on price with the global conglomerates' massive purchasing scale.
Cisco Systems, Inc. competitive advantage: What makes Cisco's dominance remarkable is not just its scale but its persistence. Whether Cisco can translate these structural advantages into sustained growth above the mid-single-digit range that has characterized its recent performance remains the central question for the next decade. Cisco's networking dominance stems from its massive installed base — estimated at over 15 million active devices globally — which creates powerful lock-in through proprietary operating systems (IOS-XE, NX-OS), management platforms (DNA Center), and the sheer complexity of ripping and replacing core network infrastructure. The company's deep relationships with Microsoft, Meta, and other hyperscalers give it a structural advantage in the fastest-growing segment of networking. Cisco has responded with its Nexus 9000 series and ACI fabric architecture, but Arista's momentum in cloud-scale networking remains a persistent competitive threat. Splunk's strength lies in on-premises and hybrid deployments among large enterprises, but the market is shifting toward cloud-native observability platforms where Datadog holds a significant advantage. White-box switches running open-source network operating systems like SONiC (Software for Open Networking in the Cloud) have gained significant traction among hyperscale cloud providers and increasingly among large enterprises. Cisco's competitive moat is built on four interlocking advantages that collectively create barriers to entry unmatched in the enterprise networking industry. With an estimated 15+ million active networking devices deployed globally, Cisco benefits from extraordinary switching costs. The second moat is Cisco's end-to-end portfolio breadth. The third advantage is Cisco's channel ecosystem. The fourth moat is Cisco's proprietary silicon and software platform. Cisco's network operating systems (IOS-XE, NX-OS, ACI) represent decades of accumulated features, bug fixes, and enterprise hardening that create deep technical lock-in. Beyond these structural advantages, Cisco benefits from brand trust in risk-averse enterprise IT departments. The old adage 'nobody ever got fired for buying Cisco' reflects a real purchasing dynamic where IT leaders prioritize vendor stability, support quality, and ecosystem maturity over raw price-performance. Cisco is targeting both hyperscale customers building massive AI training clusters and enterprise customers deploying private AI inference infrastructure. The internet was transitioning from a government research project to a commercial network, and every organization connecting to this emerging network needed exactly what Cisco sold: routers that could move data between different networks reliably and at scale.
Growth Strategy: Where Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. Are Headed
Future prospects matter as much as current results. The growth strategies below explain how Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. each plan to expand from here.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV growth strategy: That's not just a technology investment — it's a structural rerouting of the supply chain that captures margin that previously leaked to intermediaries. How quickly Bud Light's domestic position stabilizes will determine whether that 2021-to-2023 growth trajectory can continue. The company's fiscal 2023 operating margin of 32.4% stands as proof of a management team that treats cost harmonization as a competitive weapon, extracting efficiencies from acquired entities faster than any other public consumer staples company in the sector. Simultaneously, AB InBev faces intense, localized price competition from Heineken, which operates over 160 breweries and has recently accelerated its premiumization strategy to match AB InBev's margin profile, threatening to erode AB InBev's market share in key European and Asian corridors. The company's return on invested capital (ROIC) stood at 11.5% in fiscal 2023, a significant improvement from the 6.2% ROIC in 2016, demonstrating the exceptional efficiency of its capital deployment and the structural profitability of its post-SABMiller integration. The company plans to launch over 50 new No/Low SKUs by the end of 2026, including Corona Cero and Budweiser Zero, effectively creating a national non-alcoholic distribution network that will allow AB InBev to capture the health-conscious consumer market currently dominated by functional beverage startups and sparkling water brands. Simultaneously, AB InBev is investing heavily in drought-resistant barley seeds and AI-driven precision irrigation, partnering with tier-one agricultural suppliers to ensure its farmers have the exact hardware and software required to maintain crop yields in the face of accelerating climate change. To capture this value, AB InBev is launching the Smart Agriculture Initiative, a proprietary training program designed to certify 100,000 independent farmers in regenerative farming and water stewardship by 2027, effectively positioning AB InBev not just as a beverage distributor, but as the essential agricultural infrastructure for the next generation of global farming. AB InBev's growth strategy is executed through three specific, named initiatives: the 'Premiumization Acceleration Program', the 'BEES Fintech Expansion', and the 'Africa Market Penetration'. The Africa Market Penetration initiative focuses on upgrading the SABMiller legacy infrastructure to include predictive inventory ordering, using machine learning algorithms to analyze a region's historical purchasing patterns and automatically pre-stage inventory at the local depot before the retailer even places the order. For the first five centuries, the company expanded at a glacial pace, opening only a handful of additional locations across the Low Countries, prioritizing deep market penetration in Belgium over aggressive national expansion. This decision required a complete overhaul of the company's inventory management software, a massive retraining of the store staff, and a willingness to sacrifice short-term DIY foot traffic to invest in the unglamorous, back-room logistics of commercial delivery. The most underappreciated aspect of AB InBev's strategy is not its retail footprint, but its mastery of the negative cash conversion cycle as a tool for market dominance. The industry is currently undergoing a structural shift from volume-driven growth to value-driven premiumization, requiring distributors to invest heavily in No/Low alcohol formulations and smart agriculture capabilities. The core of AB InBev's margin expansion strategy relies on its premiumization architecture — specifically the Corona, Modelo, Stella Artois, and Budweiser mega-brands — which collectively represent 40% of total volume but generate gross margins exceeding 60%, compared to the 35% gross margin achieved on core value brands like Brahma or Cass. The company's unit economics are improved through a rigorous real estate and manufacturing strategy, favoring massive 15-million-hectoliter megabreweries located in low-cost agricultural corridors, which keeps production costs below 18% of net sales — significantly lower than the industry average of 24%. AB InBev categorizes its 3 million retail partners into three distinct tiers based on velocity and credit risk. The real estate and manufacturing strategy is the physical foundation of AB InBev's unit economics. This centralized approach reduces corporate overhead, ensures consistent execution of the zero-based budgeting standards across all 50 countries, and accelerates decision-making. The company's strategic focus on the informal retail sector has proven to be incredibly resilient, as independent bodegas rely on AB InBev's delivery velocity and micro-credit facilities to keep their shelves stocked and generate their own revenue. The premiumization strategy is the second pillar of AB InBev's financial engine, allowing the company to extract an additional 1500 basis points of gross profit on every dollar of revenue compared to core lagers. Heineken's strategy historically focused on massive brand marketing and premiumization, but in 2023, the company announced a strategic shift to invest $2 billion in its digital B2B platforms to directly counter AB InBev's BEES advantage, acknowledging that AB InBev's logistical superiority was eroding Heineken's emerging market share. Heineken's historical strategy focused on aggressive premiumization and massive brand marketing, building a massive retail footprint that generates significant economies of scale in purchasing and marketing. Recognizing this vulnerability, Heineken launched its 'EverGreen' strategy in 2021, committing to invest $2 billion in its digital B2B platforms and premium brand portfolio to directly counter AB InBev's emerging market advantages. However, the geopolitical fallout of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was a disaster, resulting in massive asset write-downs, supply chain disruptions, and a complete loss of credibility with institutional investors. In early 2024, Carlsberg announced the sale or closure of its Russian and Central Asian assets, a desperate attempt to cut losses and refocus on its core Western European and Asian markets. Honestly, Molson Coors operates a network of over 15 breweries, focusing primarily on the traditional wholesale distribution model. Diageo (DEO) and Constellation Brands (STZ) represent a growing threat to the premium and RTD segments of the beverage market. Many independent craft brewers have been acquired by AB InBev or Heineken, or have simply gone out of business due to the rising costs of aluminum and barley. The fiscal 2023 financial results reflect the culmination of a decade-long strategy focused on margin expansion, digital improvement, and aggressive debt reduction following the massive capital deployment of the SABMiller acquisition. The 7.5% revenue growth was achieved despite a challenging macroeconomic environment characterized by persistent inflation, elevated interest rates, and severe currency devaluations in key emerging markets. The growth was driven primarily by the premiumization strategy, which continued to expand its market share as consumers consolidated their beverage purchasing with AB InBev to take advantage of the superior brand equity and quality provided by the mega-brands. The company's aggressive premiumization strategy has been incredibly successful, as consumers and on-premise venues alike have recognized the high quality and value of the Corona, Modelo, and Stella Artois brands. The company's ability to generate such high returns on invested capital is a rare feat in the consumer staples sector, and it is the primary reason AB InBev commands a premium valuation multiple compared to its struggling peers. As the company looks to the future, it is well-positioned to continue this track record of financial excellence, driven by the continued expansion of the BEES network, the aggressive penetration of premium brands, and the disciplined deployment of free cash flow into accretive debt reduction and organic volume growth. AB InBev is currently investing heavily in its global innovation centers to train its brewers on No/Low fermentation and dealcoholization, but the capital expenditure required to equip every megabrewery with the necessary dealcoholization hardware is substantial. Heineken's aggressive premiumization strategy is a direct competitive threat that cannot be ignored. However, the same inflationary pressures have compressed the disposable income of informal retailers, leading them to defer large inventory purchases and focus only on essential fast-moving goods. In fiscal 2023, water and energy costs increased by 12% year-over-year, a headwind that management has struggled to fully offset through closed-loop recycling and solar investments. This level of logistical precision is impossible to replicate overnight; it requires years of data collection, algorithm refinement, and physical infrastructure investment. This private-equity mindset ensures that no cost is sacred, and every dollar spent must generate a measurable return on investment. When AB InBev acquires a regional brewer, it immediately deploys its ZBB task force to eliminate redundant corporate overhead, improved the supply chain, and integrate the acquired brands into the BEES platform. Anheuser-Busch InBev's growth strategy is executed through three specific, named initiatives: the 'Premiumization Acceleration Program', the 'BEES Fintech Expansion', and the 'Africa Market Penetration'. The Premiumization Acceleration Program is the financial engine of AB InBev's growth strategy, driving the shift in the sales mix toward higher-margin super-premium brands. The initiative is executed through a combination of aggressive on-premise marketing, targeted digital campaigns, and the continuous expansion of the premium product offerings. The on-premise marketing strategy focuses on placing Corona, Modelo, and Stella Artois at eye level on draft taps, adjacent to the corresponding core brands, with clear signage highlighting the quality and heritage of the premium products. The targeted digital marketing strategy use the BEES platform and the company's consumer-facing apps to promote the premium brands to informal retailers and end consumers, offering exclusive discounts and promotions to encourage trial. Informal retailers use the platform to request specific premium brands that are not currently available in their local depots, and the company's product development team works with its brewing partners to develop those formulations and add them to the catalog. This margin expansion will provide the fuel for further debt reduction, brewery expansion, and investment in the BEES network. The BEES Fintech Expansion is the technological engine of AB InBev's growth strategy, driving the continuous improvement of the BEES platform and the micro-lending program. The initiative focuses on upgrading the platform to include predictive credit underwriting, using machine learning algorithms to analyze a retailer's historical purchasing patterns, the local macroeconomic data, and the real-time repayment velocity to automatically pre-approve micro-loans before the retailer even applies for credit. The initiative also includes the integration of the BEES platform with the point-of-sale systems used by larger retailers, allowing store managers to apply for credit directly from their checkout screens without ever leaving their primary workflow. The Africa Market Penetration initiative is the geographic engine of AB InBev's growth strategy, driving the continuous improvement of the SABMiller legacy infrastructure. The initiative focuses on upgrading the African depots to include predictive inventory ordering, using machine learning algorithms to analyze a region's historical purchasing patterns and automatically pre-stage inventory at the local depot before the retailer even places the order. The combination of the Premiumization Acceleration Program, the BEES Fintech Expansion, and the Africa Market Penetration creates a comprehensive growth strategy that addresses the financial, technological, and geographic dimensions of the business. This three-pronged approach ensures that AB InBev can continue to grow revenue, expand margins, and defend its market position against the intense competition in the global beverage market. The disciplined execution of these three initiatives will allow AB InBev to achieve its long-term financial targets, including mid-single-digit revenue growth, gross margin expansion, and aggressive debt reduction, solidifying its position as the dominant force in the global beverage market. The company plans to launch over 50 new No/Low SKUs by the end of 2026, including Corona Cero and Budweiser Zero, effectively creating a global non-alcoholic distribution network that will allow AB InBev to capture the health-conscious consumer market currently dominated by functional beverage startups and sparkling water brands. The expansion of the No/Low portfolio represents a fundamental shift in AB InBev's product strategy, moving beyond the traditional 5% ABV core lagers to a comprehensive portfolio of health-conscious beverages. The No/Low expansion will also allow AB InBev to consolidate its presence in the on-premise channel, reducing the overall marketing investment required to support the same level of brand visibility. This portfolio consolidation will improve marketing ROI, reduce brand confusion, and free up working capital that can be deployed into debt reduction or further digital infrastructure investment. The integration of smart agriculture technologies is a critical component of AB InBev's future strategy, as the global agricultural industry undergoes the most significant climatic transition in its history. AB InBev is currently investing heavily in its Smart Agriculture Initiative to train its farmers and agronomists on regenerative farming and precision irrigation. The initiative will offer a combination of online courses, in-person training sessions, and hands-on workshops, covering everything from basic soil health procedures to advanced AI-driven irrigation techniques. The Smart Agriculture Initiative will also serve as a powerful marketing tool, attracting new institutional investors who are looking for a consumer staples company that can provide a sustainable, climate-proof supply chain. The disciplined capital allocation strategy, combined with the rapidly deleveraging balance sheet, provides the company with the financial flexibility to continue its moderate volume growth and capital return program, even in the event of a significant economic downturn. This focus on service and convenience built a loyal customer base in the Leuven area, and the brewers slowly expanded their footprint across the Low Countries, opening a new brewery every few decades. However, this conservative growth strategy meant that by the 1980s, the local Belgian brewers had only a handful of breweries, all concentrated in Belgium. Meanwhile, global conglomerates were expanding aggressively across the world, using massive television advertising budgets and a standardized, high-volume lager model that appealed to the growing number of consumers who were purchasing their beer through mass-market channels. While the global giants were focused on organic volume growth, the local brewers were being underserved by the global conglomerates, who prioritized the high-volume, low-margin mass business over the low-volume, high-service local business. The new management decided to shift the company's strategy entirely, focusing all of its resources on becoming the undisputed logistical partner for the global brewing industry through aggressive acquisitions. This decision required a massive infusion of capital to overhaul the supply chain, build the global distribution network, and invest in the necessary technology. The irony is, the company executed a radical internal reorganization in 1987, merging Piedboeuf and Leuven to form Interbrew, raising the necessary capital by reinvesting all of its profits and taking on significant debt to fund the strategic shift. The merger was a critical moment in the company's history, as it provided the financial resources needed to execute the acquisition strategy and allowed the new management to retain control of the company through a concentrated ownership structure. The idea was to acquire regional brewers, centralize their slow-moving inventory in a single global location, and use a dedicated DSD fleet to transfer those products to the local markets multiple times a day. The company had to invest millions of dollars in custom software development, creating a proprietary system that could track the real-time location of every keg in the network and improved the delivery routes for the fleet. The financial press was highly critical of the strategy, arguing that Interbrew was sacrificing short-term local relevance for a logistical pipe dream. However, the new management remained committed to the strategy, knowing that the long-term benefits of the global network would far outweigh the short-term pain. The operating margins expanded by 400 basis points, validating the global strategy and setting the stage for two decades of relentless, industry-leading compounding. The decision to shift to the global distribution market and invest in the centralized network was a bold move that required a massive infusion of capital and a willingness to endure short-term pain for long-term gain. What remained added Africa, Latin America, and Asia Pacific to AB InBev's portfolio in a way that no organic growth strategy could have replicated.
Cisco Systems, Inc. growth strategy: The company accomplished this through a relentless acquisition strategy — more than 220 companies purchased over four decades — and a methodical shift toward recurring software revenue that now accounts for over 51% of total sales. For investors and industry observers, Cisco represents a fascinating case study in corporate reinvention. The company sits at the intersection of several massive technology trends — AI infrastructure buildout, zero-trust security adoption, hybrid cloud networking, and the ongoing digitization of every industry. The Security segment, now significantly bolstered by the Splunk acquisition, represents Cisco's fastest-growing opportunity. With Splunk's Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) capabilities, Cisco now offers an full-cycle security operations platform that spans threat detection, investigation, and response. Honestly, this transition matters enormously for valuation because recurring revenue is more predictable, carries higher lifetime value, and commands premium multiples from investors. The company's go-to-market strategy relies on a massive channel partner network. This indirect model allows Cisco to maintain relatively lean direct sales teams while benefiting from partners' local relationships and implementation expertise. Key distribution partners include Ingram Micro, TD Synnex, and Arrow Electronics, while solution partners range from global system integrators like Accenture and Deloitte to thousands of regional value-added resellers. While still a small percentage of total revenue, AI infrastructure is growing at triple-digit rates and positions Cisco to capture a meaningful share of the estimated $100+ billion AI infrastructure buildout over the next five years. The company's market capitalization exceeds $466 billion, reflecting investor confidence in its ability to capture growth from AI infrastructure buildout, campus networking refresh cycles, and security platform consolidation. In campus and branch networking, Cisco faces growing pressure from Hewlett Packard Enterprise's Aruba division and Juniper Networks (now being acquired by HPE). In the emerging AI infrastructure market, Cisco faces competition from NVIDIA (whose InfiniBand and Spectrum-X networking solutions dominate GPU cluster interconnection), Broadcom (supplying custom networking ASICs to hyperscalers), and Arista (expanding into AI/ML networking). Cisco's Silicon One-based platforms and its relationships with enterprise customers building private AI infrastructure represent its competitive angle, but winning against NVIDIA's network dominance in AI networking requires sustained investment and technical differentiation. The growth was driven by the full-year contribution of Splunk (acquired March 2024) and recovering demand for networking infrastructure, particularly AI-related orders. If Splunk's growth decelerates under Cisco's ownership or key talent departs, the acquisition's strategic rationale could be undermined. Silicon Valley's competitive labor market means that any perception of instability can trigger accelerated attrition among high performers. With over 60,000 active channel partners globally, Cisco has built the most extensive go-to-market network in enterprise technology. These partners — ranging from global system integrators to local managed service providers — have invested heavily in Cisco certifications, built practices around Cisco technologies, and developed customer relationships that effectively extend Cisco's sales force by orders of magnitude. Competitors attempting to displace Cisco must not only build superior products but also convince partners to invest in new certifications and risk existing customer relationships. The company's investment in programmable infrastructure through APIs, automation frameworks (DNA Center, ACI), and intent-based networking further differentiates its platforms from commodity alternatives. Cisco's growth strategy under CEO Chuck Robbins centers on four interconnected pillars designed to drive the company from mid-single-digit to high-single-digit or low-double-digit revenue growth. Yet the first pillar is AI infrastructure, where Cisco is investing heavily in Silicon One-based networking platforms improved for GPU cluster interconnection. Cisco's strategy is to reduce the average enterprise's security vendor count (currently 50-70 tools) by offering an integrated platform that shares telemetry and automates response across all attack surfaces. The fourth pillar is geographic and market expansion, particularly in emerging markets where digital infrastructure investment is accelerating. Cisco is also pursuing growth in the service provider segment through 5G infrastructure, in the public sector through FedRAMP-certified solutions, and in industrial IoT through ruggedized networking platforms for manufacturing, energy, and transportation verticals. First, the AI infrastructure buildout is driving unprecedented demand for high-performance networking. If AI capital expenditure continues growing at projected rates (hyperscalers are guiding to $200+ billion in combined capex for 2025), Cisco's networking revenue could accelerate meaningfully. Third, the Splunk integration is creating cross-selling opportunities that could drive above-market growth in security and observability. Competition from Arista in data center networking, Palo Alto Networks in security, and NVIDIA in AI infrastructure could limit Cisco's ability to capture its fair share of market growth. The company's FY2026 guidance of $61-62 billion implies only 8-9% growth — respectable but not the acceleration that would justify a premium multiple. The most likely outcome falls between these scenarios: Cisco delivers mid-to-high single-digit revenue growth over the next 3-5 years, driven by AI infrastructure, campus refresh, and Splunk-powered security expansion, while maintaining non-GAAP operating margins in the 33-36% range. This trajectory would support continued dividend growth and share repurchases, making Cisco a compelling total-return investment even if it never recaptures the hypergrowth of its early decades. Bosack and Lerner mortgaged their home, maxed out credit cards, and reportedly survived on their Stanford salaries while building the business nights and weekends.
Financial Picture: Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc.
A closer look at the financial trajectory of Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc. rounds out the comparison.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV: The 2008 hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch cost $52 billion. The 2016 SABMiller deal cost roughly $100 billion. Together, they created a company that controls 30 percent of global beer volume and generates $59.38 billion in annual revenue. The BEES B2B platform processes over $30 billion in annual transactions directly with retailers, reducing dependence on traditional wholesale distributors. AB InBev's $5.3 billion net income on $59.38 billion in revenue reflects an 8.9 percent net margin — respectable for a consumer staples company but below what the portfolio's premium brand mix could theoretically generate. The net leverage ratio's decline from 5.0 times in 2016 to 3.1 times by fiscal 2023 represents one of the largest corporate deleveraging efforts in consumer goods history — $4.5 billion in debt paid down in 2023 alone. Revenue grew from $54.3 billion in 2021 to $59.38 billion in 2023, a 9 percent increase driven primarily by price increases and the premium brand mix shift rather than volume growth. InBev raised its bid to $70 per share, valuing the company at $52 billion, and the board capitulated.
Cisco Systems, Inc.: Yet this $57 billion revenue machine started as a love story between two Stanford University computer scientists who simply wanted their campus computers to talk to each other. In an industry where hardware companies routinely get reshaped by software upstarts, Cisco has survived the dot-com crash that vaporized $400 billion of its market capitalization in 2001, weathered the rise of cloud computing that threatened to make its physical boxes obsolete, and navigated the software-defined networking revolution that promised to commoditize its core products. With the $28 billion Splunk acquisition fully integrated, Cisco posted $56.7 billion in revenue with GAAP net income of $10.5 billion. The company's annualized recurring revenue surpassed $29.6 billion, and AI infrastructure orders from hyperscale customers exceeded $2 billion — more than double management's original target. This restructuring, which carried a $1 billion charge, reflected the painful reality that building a software-first company requires different skills than manufacturing networking hardware. Cisco Systems, Inc. is the world's largest networking equipment and enterprise software company, generating $56.7 billion in fiscal year 2025 revenue. Under CEO Chuck Robbins, Cisco has aggressively shifted toward software and recurring revenue, highlighted by the $28 billion acquisition of Splunk in March 2024. The company employs approximately 86,200 people across more than 180 countries and maintains a market capitalization exceeding $466 billion. Understanding this evolution is essential to grasping how Cisco generates its $56.7 billion in annual revenue and why its gross margins have remained resilient despite intense competition. The security market is projected to exceed $300 billion by 2028, and Cisco's ability to embed security directly into its networking infrastructure — inspecting traffic at the switch and router level — gives it a structural advantage that pure-play security vendors cannot replicate. Splunk alone contributed approximately $4.3 billion in annualized recurring revenue at the time of acquisition, and the combined observability portfolio positions Cisco to capture the growing enterprise need for unified visibility across hybrid and multi-cloud environments. In FY2024, subscription revenue reached $27.4 billion, representing 51% of total revenue — a milestone that would have seemed impossible a decade ago when hardware sales dominated. Total annualized recurring revenue (ARR) reached $29.6 billion, growing 22% year over year. The company generates substantial free cash flow — typically $12-15 billion annually — which funds dividends, share repurchases, and acquisitions. Cisco has returned over $150 billion to shareholders through buybacks and dividends since initiating its capital return program. In FY2025, AI infrastructure orders from hyperscale customers exceeded $2 billion, more than doubling management's original $1 billion target. Cisco Systems, Inc. is a Networking Equipment & Enterprise Software company with $56.7B in 2025 revenue and 86K employees worldwide. Today, Cisco generates $56.7 billion in annual revenue across networking, security, collaboration, and observability segments, employing 86,200 people worldwide. With the $28 billion Splunk acquisition completed in 2024, Cisco now commands the broadest portfolio in enterprise infrastructure, spanning from the physical network layer through application observability and security operations. Arista's revenue exceeded $6.7 billion in 2024, growing at rates that dwarf Cisco's core networking business. Cisco competes against Palo Alto Networks (the market leader in next-generation firewalls with over $8 billion in revenue), CrowdStrike (dominant in endpoint detection and response), Fortinet (strong in unified threat management for mid-market), and Zscaler (leading cloud-delivered security). Honestly, the observability market, where Cisco now competes through Splunk, AppDynamics, and ThousandEyes, features strong competition from Datadog (growing revenue above $2.5 billion with superior cloud-native capabilities), Dynatrace, New Relic, and Elastic. Full-year revenue reached $56.7 billion, representing 5% growth over FY2024's $53.8 billion — a recovery from the revenue decline experienced in FY2024 when enterprise customers digested excess inventory ordered during supply chain disruptions. GAAP net income for FY2025 was $10.5 billion, or $2.61 per share, reflecting the impact of Splunk-related amortization and restructuring charges from the company's workforce reductions. Non-GAAP net income reached $15.2 billion, or $3.81 per share, demonstrating the underlying profitability of Cisco's operations when excluding acquisition-related accounting effects. The gap between GAAP and non-GAAP results — approximately $4.7 billion — primarily reflects intangible asset amortization from Splunk and other acquisitions, stock-based compensation, and restructuring costs. Free cash flow generation remained solid at approximately $13-14 billion for FY2025, funding Cisco's generous capital return program. The company paid approximately $6.8 billion in dividends (quarterly dividend of $0.40 per share) and executed significant share repurchases. Cisco's balance sheet carried approximately $17-18 billion in cash and investments against roughly $30 billion in long-term debt, much of which was raised to fund the Splunk acquisition. Looking at the revenue trajectory: FY2023 revenue was $57.0 billion (the pre-inventory-digestion peak), FY2024 declined to $53.8 billion as customers worked through excess orders, and FY2025 recovered to $56.7 billion with Splunk's contribution. Merging a $28 billion acquisition — Cisco's largest ever — requires flawless execution across product integration, sales alignment, and cultural assimilation. History shows that large technology acquisitions frequently destroy value; Cisco's own track record includes mixed results from major deals like the $3.7 billion Duo Security acquisition and the $2.35 billion AppDynamics purchase. The company's FY2025 AI infrastructure orders of $2 billion — doubling its original target — validate this strategy, and management expects AI networking to become a multi-billion-dollar annual revenue stream within 2-3 years. The goal is to grow ARR from $29.6 billion toward $35-40 billion over the next 3 years, which would provide greater revenue predictability and higher lifetime customer value. Every GPU cluster requires sophisticated network fabrics to connect thousands of accelerators, and Cisco's Silicon One-based platforms are winning design slots with hyperscale customers — evidenced by $2 billion in AI infrastructure orders in FY2025 alone. Revenue grew from nothing to $1.5 million in the first year of commercial sales, then doubled and redoubled as the internet expanded. The couple sold their Cisco shares — worth approximately $170 million at the time — and donated much of the proceeds to charity. Those shares would eventually have been worth over $40 billion at Cisco's peak valuation. Under John Chambers, who became CEO in 1995, Cisco would acquire over 180 companies, building the most comprehensive networking portfolio in the industry and briefly becoming the world's most valuable company in March 2000 with a market capitalization exceeding $500 billion.
Company-Specific SWOT Notes
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV
AB InBev's BEES platform processes $30 billion in transactions across 3 million retailers, a logistical metric that creates insurmountable switching costs for informal bodegas and secures an 88% customer retention rate.
The financial architecture of the business is built on a self-reinforcing flywheel where procurement scale drives margin expansion, which funds debt reduction from the SABMiller acquisition, which frees up capital to invest in the BEES digital ecosystem.
The $100 billion SABMiller acquisition left the company with $68 billion in long-term debt, resulting in a 3.
As the global consumer shifts toward health and wellness, AB InBev can capture high-margin revenue by equipping its breweries with dealcoholization hardware and its farmers with drought-resistant seeds, a market projected to grow at 25% CAGR.
The proliferation of GLP-1 weight-loss drugs and the cultural shift toward sobriety among Gen Z consumers threaten to permanently compress the total addressable market for traditional fermented malt beverages, potentially eroding the 50% of revenue that comes
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco's 15+ million active networking devices deployed globally create extraordinary switching costs that protect its market position.
What makes Cisco's dominance remarkable is not just its scale but its persistence.
Despite significant progress in software and subscriptions, Cisco's growth rate remains constrained by the mature, cyclical nature of its core networking hardware business.
The global AI infrastructure buildout — with hyperscalers guiding to $200+ billion in combined capital expenditure for 2025 — creates an enormous new addressable market for high-performance networking.
The rise of open-source network operating systems like SONiC (backed by Microsoft and adopted by major hyperscalers) combined with white-box switches from ODMs threatens Cisco's premium pricing model.
Head-to-Head Scorecard
| Category | Winner | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue Scale | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV reports the larger revenue base ($59.4B), which serves as a core operational scale signal. |
| Profitability Potential | Comparable | Both organizations prioritize market penetration or are at equivalent reporting tiers. |
| Company Age | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Founded in 2004 vs 1984. The earlier pioneer typically commands longer historical institutional legacy. |
| Innovation Moat | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Higher aggregate count of major acquisitions and key R&D releases indicates a more active technology absorption velocity. |
| Scale (Employees) | Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | A significantly larger reported workforce supports enhanced global distribution capability. |
| Market Cap | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Higher public valuation denotes greater forward-looking investor conviction in earnings potential. |
| Future Outlook | Tied | Strategic auditing assesses that both maintain defensive leadership vectors within their core market clusters. |
Who Wins Each Category?
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV reports the larger revenue base ($59.4B), which serves as a core operational scale signal.
Both organizations prioritize market penetration or are at equivalent reporting tiers.
Founded in 2004 vs 1984. The earlier pioneer typically commands longer historical institutional legacy.
Higher aggregate count of major acquisitions and key R&D releases indicates a more active technology absorption velocity.
A significantly larger reported workforce supports enhanced global distribution capability.
Who Wins: Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV or Cisco Systems, Inc.?
Reviewed by Swet Parvadiya, May 2026 - Author Profile
Our analysts compile business strategy profiles from public financial filings, press releases, and analyst reports. Each profile is reviewed for accuracy before publication by our editorial desk and updated on a rolling basis.
Frequently Asked Questions: Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc.
Is Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV better than Cisco Systems, Inc.?
Verdict: Between Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Cisco Systems, Inc., Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV is the stronger overall option based on higher annual revenue. The decision still depends on which factors matter most for your needs, but on the weight of the evidence above, Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV comes out ahead in this Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV vs Cisco Systems, Inc. comparison.
Who earns more — Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV or Cisco Systems, Inc.?
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV earns more with $59.4B in annual revenue versus Cisco Systems, Inc.'s $56.7B. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV leads on total revenue based on latest verified figures.
Which company has higher revenue — Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV or Cisco Systems, Inc.?
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV reported $59.4B, while Cisco Systems, Inc. reported $56.7B. The revenue leader is Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV based on latest verified figures.
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV revenue vs Cisco Systems, Inc. revenue — which is higher?
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV revenue: $59.4B. Cisco Systems, Inc. revenue: $56.7B. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV has the larger revenue base of the two companies.
Sources & References
- Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV Corporate Website
- Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV Annual Report 2023 - Revenue and Financial Data
- ab-inbev.com
- SEC EDGAR: Cisco Systems, Inc. Annual Filings (10-K, 8-K)
- Cisco Systems, Inc. Corporate Website
- Cisco Systems, Inc. Annual Report 2025 - Revenue and Financial Data
- sec.gov
- investor.cisco.com
- investor.cisco.com
- data.sec.gov
- investor.cisco.com